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Introduction
School prayer represents a curiosity of Reagan-era politics. Reagan and the social
conservative movement secured numerous successes in accommodating religious practice and
faith in the public sphere. Yet, when it came to “restor[ing] the right of individuals to participate
in voluntary, non-denominational prayer in schools…”1 conservatives never succeeded in
securing the judicial victory that they sought. If anything, the Supreme Court became more
skeptical of devotional exercises in public educational settings2 even as it permitted public
monies to flow to theistic organizations3 and allowed the government to display religious
symbols on public property.4 The question of why conservatives scored victories on some of its
religious agenda but not prayer provides insight for those interested in the activities of political
entrepreneurs, political regimes, and the permeability of legal institutions.
This paper is an attempt to reconcile Reagan era successes with Reagan era failures by
utilizing the insights of scholarship on political entrepreneurship. The study of entrepreneurial
activity dates back at least to Robert Dahl and his seminal work Who Governs? Dahl identified a
host of activities consistent with transformative effects on policies and institutions. Dahl and
many of his scions were primarily concerned with stability and equilibrium. However, as Adam
Sheingate observed, attention to entrepreneurial activity can highlight how “political and
institutional complexity shape prospects for change” (186). Scrutinizing the way political actors
attempt to alter policies and institutions “focuses our attention on the boundaries between
institutions and the complex characteristics of the American political system as a whole” (186).
The boundaries between law and politics become that much more clear by scrutinizing the efforts
of the Reagan Administration to bring about change to prayer policy. Whereas Reagan and his
congressional allies were able to secure a limited victory in the legislative arena when it secured
the Equal Access Act of 1984, it failed to overturn Engel v. Vitale and its lineage despite targeted
judicial selection and institutional change in the Solicitor General’s office. This failure
highlights how legal institutions can be less permeable to regime objectives—a phenomenon that
is yet under-theorized in the budding regime politics literature.
This paper will proceed by first identifying how the entrepreneurial activity by President
Ronald Reagan and congressional Republicans resulted in passage of the Equal Access Act.
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Second, the paper will examine institutional changes in judicial selection and the Office of the
Solicitor General designed to bring about changes to school prayer jurisprudence. Third, the
paper identifies reasons why these institutional reforms failed to bring about change. Finally, the
paper concludes with a brief discussion of why the failed transformation matters for the partisan
regime literature in political science.

Entrepreneurship in Legislation
Reagan reached office during a time of overlapping and uncertain political orders. First,
the New Deal-Great Society political order finally deteriorated and stood ready to be transformed
into a more tempered era of renewed federalism, deregulation, and fiscal conservatism. Second,
Reagan entered this transformative moment in the midst of the era of divided government and a
thickened institutional context.5 Transformation of the political order would necessarily need
both to win over Democratic congressional majorities throughout much of Reagan’s tenure in
office (although not initially) and overcome deeply entrenched institutional pathways adept at
resisting change. Finally, Reagan rode the crest of the social conservative movement that
cobbled together a new coalition mobilized for fights over school prayer, abortion, and the like.
Thus, Reagan’s task was to create what Sheingold has referred to as “creative recombinations”
that would restore “a fundamental part of our American heritage and privilege.”6
On school prayer, Reagan sought change in ways consistent with the modern
plebicitarian presidency and his transformative position. Unable to rely solely on partisan or
ideological support in the Congress, Reagan pushed his agenda through a combination of direct
popular appeals, grassroots mobilization of the New Religious Right, and direct legislative
lobbying. In virtually every speech Reagan delivered addressing school prayer, Reagan called
upon his audience to contact members of the House and Senate and inform them of their
support.7 The policy did not appear to be merely symbolic as public opinion polls at the time
showed overwhelming popular support for the amendment, which Reagan also regularly noted in
his stump speeches. Reagan’s direct appeals echoed the campaigns of religious organizations
such as the Moral Majority, Christian Voice, Concerned Women for America and the network of
broadcast evangelicals that urged their followers to contact their senators (Hertzke 1988, 165).
The strategy netted results so overwhelming that the Senate installed new phone lines to handle
the call volume.
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Yet, an important feature of this early mobilization was its unidimensionality. Early
mobilization efforts of religious conservatives occurred almost exclusively at the grassroots
level. The movement lacked an effective and coherent lobby that proved vital at the microlegislative level.8 The religious lobby had as of yet failed to fully institutionalize their
participation inside the Beltway and, as a result, depended on sectional-based popular
mobilization. The result was the well-organized lobby of groups opposed to a school prayer
constitutional amendment such as the ACLU and the NEA provided “effective and articulate
opposition.”9 The primary source of direct legislative pressure came from the Reagan
Administration but it was unable to frame the issue in a way consistent with the interests and
philosophies of Senators from states where the fundamentalist and evangelical movements were
weak. The constitutional amendment on school prayer mustered a simple majority of 55 but fell
well short of the two-thirds majority needed.
While a constitutional amendment was out of reach, the networks and channels
established in the effort created a powerful combination of forces that netted social conservatives
the Equal Access Act. The Equal Access Act represented a more modest attempt to
accommodate religious activities in public educational settings by guaranteeing that religious
groups would have the same access to public school facilities as secular organizations.
Opponents of the legislation labeled it an attempt to bring prayer “through the back door using
the soothing and apparently neutral language of equal access.”10 Among these opponents ranked
lawmakers in key veto position such as Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill and Don Edwards,
Chairmen of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights. Despite
powerful opposition, Reagan and socially conservative legislators were able to secure passage of
the Act by utilizing previously established policy network of legislators, interest groups, citizens,
and administration officials.
Prior to the failure of the school prayer amendment, Reagan laid the foundation for
mission-shift to the equal access act. In his speeches on the prayer amendment, Reagan regularly
mentioned equal access legislation. Immediately following the Senate’s vote on the prayer
amendment, he urged congressional action on equal access.11 A coalition of Republican and
Bible Belt Democrats responded and sponsored several different bills that contained the same
rights of access although differed on enforcement mechanisms. Through a series of
parliamentary maneuvers O’Neill and Edwards managed to kill off one bill that would have cut
off federal education monies to noncompliant schools. However, as the movement appeared to
be stymied, the grassroots campaign machine, forged to secure the prayer amendment, was
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employed to even greater effect. Perhaps more importantly, the small network of religiously
affiliated interest groups already in DC, (e.g. the Baptist Joint Committee and the National
Association of Evangelicals) worked with both legislators and opposition groups (e.g. the
ACLU) to draft a bill that minimized constitutional objections of those with “back door”
concerns —such as extending access protections to political, philosophical, and religious groups.
The bill was amended to an educational funding bill and, once access was guaranteed only before
or after school hours, passed the Senate 88-11. On the House side, after some procedural
wrangling with the still opposed Speaker O’Neill, the bill passed 337-77 and Reagan signed the
bill into law two weeks later.
To recap, the Reagan Administration sought but ultimately failed to secure a
constitutional amendment on school prayer but the network of grassroots activists, religious
lobbyists, and conservative lawmakers proved vital for securing the Equal Access Act of 1984,
which created greater accommodation for religious activity in public schools. Reagan pledged
policy change on religion in American public education and he employed his unique,
transformative position to overcome entrenched resistance. Despite “unrealistic” chances of
“even incremental legislation in support of Reagan’s social policies,”12 the “creative
recombination” on display above proved formative. The legislative effort to secure school
prayer yielded the EAA and demonstrated that legislating the social conservative agenda could
bear fruit.
Entrepreneurship in Litigation
If Reagan managed to secure a notable victory in the legislative arena where opponents
occupied crucial veto points, why did the Reagan Administration (and subsequent conservative
administrations) fail to transform school prayer’s constitutionality through the federal judiciary
that had been highly Reagonized by 1988?13 The question becomes that much more curious in
light of the “political regime” literature, which posits that judicial power is employed in much
the same way as “legislative delegations to executive or quasi-executive agencies.”14 If the
“Reagan judiciary” acted in a way consistent with a conservative White House and a Republican
majority in the Senate,15 then we should expect equal, or perhaps greater,16 traction for school
prayer in the national courts. However, if anything, school prayer moved further from
constitutional sanction during the Reagan and post-Reagan periods. This hostility occurred
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despite the desire to change, an effort to secure change through judicial appointment, and
institutional change at the Office of the Solicitor General designed to facilitate a conservative
legal argument before the High Court.
Institutional Change and Reagan’s Judicial Strategy
The Reagan Administration’s desire to transform the national judiciary has been well
documented and need not be rehashed fully here. However, the attempt to shift the national
judiciary to the right contained notable institutional changes. The Office of Legal Policy created
a systematized, extensive interviewing process for potential judicial nominees.17 Moreover, the
Administration created the President’s Committee on Federal Judicial Selection, which was
tasked with identifying political, philosophical, and ideological concerns. The overlapping
scrutiny helped to ensure that nominees “would be sympathetic to the social agenda positions of
the administration.”18 By the end of his second term, Reagan had appointed 47% of the federal
judiciary and vetted his selections to ensure they embraced “strict construction of the
Constitution rather than a liberal agenda based on a concept of judicial activism.”19 Scholars of
judicial appointments credit Reagan with being highly successful in ideological transformation
of the federal judiciary. As Sheldon Goldman observed in 1989, the administration—particularly
under the leadership of Attorney General Edwin Meese—successfully “fine tun[ed] the selection
process to place on the bench younger, vigorous, more aggressive supporters of the
administration's judicial philosophy that would indeed constitute a lasting Regan legacy on the
courts.”20
Institutional Change and the Office of the Solicitor General
Transforming Supreme Court jurisprudence is aided greatly by the development of more
sophisticated legal arguments. Administrations rely heavily on the Office of the Solicitor
General to develop winning legal arguments consistent with administration preferences. Yet, the
Office of the Solicitor General is almost exclusively staffed with career lawyers, not political
officials. Leading Reagan Administration officials believed that career lawyers were hampering
the Solicitor General (Rex Lee) in crafting arguments in line with Reagan’s preferences.21 To
give the Administration greater presence in the SG’s office, the position of Counselor to the
Solicitor General and Deputy Solicitor General was created. The new position, initially filled by
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Paul Bator of Harvard Law School, bore the moniker of political deputy and helped ensure that
Reagan Administration positions had equivalent voice to the careerist choir.22
Bator’s impact was notable in the area of the religion clauses. He led the SG’s efforts in
Lynch v. Donnelly,23 which netted Reagan a victory when the Court reached the rather
counterintuitive conclusion that a crèche display fulfilled a secular legislative purpose and,
therefore, survived the Lemon test. Bator also played a major role in crafting the SG’s in
Wallace v. Jaffree24 and arguing it before the Court. But Wallace, as will be demonstrated
below, is informative as to the degree to which the boundaries of legal institutions are less
permeable to regime preferences than other agencies that sit more directly in the stream of
American politics.

Judicial Transformation: An Incomplete Success
While the Reagan Administration created new means of securing judicial ideologues and
were quite successful in doing so, there were at least three intervening factors that limited the
impact of transformation in Supreme Court school prayer jurisprudence. First, Reagan made a
critical choice while campaigning in 1980. He pledged, “One of the first Supreme Court
vacancies in my administration will be filled by the most qualified woman I can find…”25 In
essence, Reagan injected one additional variable into his judicial calculus and the results were
notable. O’Connor proved reliably conservative on issues like federalism and criminal due
process but was significantly less doctrinaire on social issues including school prayer. And
O’Connor’s moderate social jurisprudence was well-known before her selection and netted
protests from prominent social conservatives like Jerry Falwell, John Willke, and Jesse Helms.26
In essence, Reagan’s first-order social goals clashed with his electoral strategy (i.e. broadening
his electoral coalition by wooing women) and the result was the selection of a justice less
reliably conservative on the Administration’s social priorities than subsequent selections.27
Second, the permeability of courts is constrained by the role of the Senate and the
possibility of divided government. For Reagan, six of his eight years in office saw Republican
control of the Senate. In the final two years, the Democrats controlled the Senate and Reagan’s
difficulties filling Justice Powell’s seat demonstrated how formidable this constraint could be.
22
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The nomination of Robert Bork indicated the Reagan Administration’s commitment to push the
Court further to the right but it also failed to account for Democratic resolve to place what
limitations they could on the transformation. Further adding to the difficulty of railroading Bork
through the Senate was Reagan’s vulnerability in the wake of the Iran-Contra Affair. The failure
of Bork’s nomination (and the implosion of Ginsburg’s brief nomination) taught the Reagan
Administration that pressing its judicial agenda in the same way it had in its first six years would
not work. The nomination of Anthony Kennedy, a well-regarded, uncontroversial center-right
moderate,28 proved detrimental to altering school prayer jurisprudence as Kennedy repeatedly
voted against efforts to bring prayer back into public educational settings.29
Third, Reagan’s desire to reconstruct the national judiciary was born not simply out of
raw policy preference but also a philosophical commitment that privileged judicial restraint over
judicial activism. As Reagan opined in 1985, “I’m very proud of our record of finding highly
qualified individuals who also adhere to a restrained and truly judicious view of the rule [sic.] of
the courts—or the role of the courts under our Constitution.”30 Paul Bestor put it this way, “We
ask that [judges] be scrupulous not to rule, not to act, to leave the exercise of power to others,
where the law does not justify judicial intervention.”31 Grover Rees, special assistant to Attorney
General Meese, stated it slightly differently, “We look for judicial philosophy, not ideology. We
don’t want judges enacting conservative ideology from the bench any more than we want them
enacting liberal ideology.”32
In the matter of school prayer jurisprudence, perhaps it is no great surprise when justices,
selected—at least in part—due to their restrained judicial philosophies, act restrained in the
application of precedential line of cases dating back to 1947. Justices O’Connor and Kennedy
noted this deference to precedent in opinions they either penned or joined. In Wallace v. Jaffree,
Justice O’Connor rejected Justice Rehnquist’s argument that the Court’s school prayer
jurisprudence should be discarded because it is inconsistent with Framer’s intent. Rather, she
argues that the Court should uphold and refine the Lemon test to create “a principle for
constitutional adjudication…that is also capable of consistent application.”33 In Lee v. Weisman,
Justice Kennedy wrote, “the controlling precedents as they relate to prayer and religious exercise
in primary and secondary public schools compel the holding here that the policy of the city of
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Providence is an unconstitutional one.”34 Justice O’Connor joined Justice Souter’s concurrence
that in reference to the Engel line, “Such is the settled law. Here, as elsewhere, we should stick
to it absent some compelling reason to discard it.”35 By the time the Court decided Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe, the adherence to the Engel line is so entrenched that the
majority opinion, authored by Justice Stevens and joined by O’Connor and Kennedy, does not
even bother to take up the need to follow precedent despite Chief Justice Rehnquist’s familiar
originalist complaint in dissent.36 Judicial restraint was part of Reagan’s transformative vision
but restraint as a judicial philosophy also limited the impact of his transformative agenda in the
national judiciary.
Multiple Commitments and Limits on the Solicitor General
The addition of a political deputy to the Solicitor General’s staff was a provocative and
useful innovation. As Rex Lee observed, “It just makes sense to have someone other than the
solicitor general himself who…is not only a very fine lawyer but also comes from a politically
sensitive background and who regards as part of his or her responsibilities not just the legal
aspects of the job but the broader governmental ones as well.”37 However, even with a greater
political presence in the SG’s office, their ability to craft transformative arguments is constrained
by its unique position in a president’s administration. The SG’s office is tasked with multiple
commitments that can be in tension with one another. One scholar notes that the SG “must pay
heed to the justices, legal norms, the politics of the administration, public opinion, and the needs
of other agencies and divisions.”38 Moreover, the SG must protect its unique institutional
relationship with the high court. Administration priorities can conflict with upholding legal
norms and protecting the prestige of the office. In other words, political actors may prefer to use
the law as a resource to change policy whereas careerists may prefer to use the law as a resource
for maintaining relationships and institutional prestige.
School prayer was case in point. Reagan Administration desires to change school prayer
jurisprudence conflicted with the way SG lawyers normally selected cases.39 The SG’s office
took a particularly cautious approach to school prayer because many SG lawyers believed the
issue was underdeveloped.40 Moreover, circumstances surrounding Wallace v. Jaffree gave rise
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to concerns that, if the SG’s office argued that the lower court was correct in upholding
Alabama’s school prayer act, it would “encourage lawlessness on the part of lower-court
judges.”41 The SG’s office needed to consider more than just the Administration’s preferences,
they needed to uphold the rule of law and they concluded adherence to the strictures of stare
decisis is a pillar of the rule of law. Norms of process and principles impacted the vigor with
which the SG pursued school prayer jurisprudential change. Not even the addition of the
political deputy significantly altered commitment to these norms.42

Conclusion
Reagan’s entrepreneurial activity recast the judicial selection process and the
organization of the SG’s office. The Administration’s commitment to ideological transformation
was notable for its intensity and priority. Reagan’s working group on judicial selection was
adopted by both the Bush and Clinton Administrations. Scholars note that the SG’s office
became increasingly politicized following the Reagan Administration generally and the creation
of the political deputy specifically.
Reagan Administration activities pressed a new conservative legal agenda and netted
major victories. The jurisprudential fruit born under Reagan’s efforts can be tied directly to the
effort to transform the legal agenda. The creation of the political deputy placed greater
administration presence in the SG’s office and provided some counterbalance to careerist
perspectives. Reagan’s innovations in judicial selection helped place resulted conservative
judges on the federal bench. Despite these innovations, Reagan’s creative recombinations netted
less than desired for the social conservative agenda. Reagan clearly targeted school prayer along
with abortion as part of his reconstructive vision. Yet, policy change on these issues was
contingent on the cooperation of legal institutions vested with unique norms, rules, incentives,
and constituents. These unique institutional features demonstrate the fragmentation in American
governance and the difficulties political regimes experience in realizing their objectives across
differing political terrain. Part of Reagan’s reconstructive agenda was stymied by a judicial
system less permeable to the conservative vision for prayer in America’s public schools.
There are important lessons here for scholars interested in a regime politics approach to
law and courts. Building on the works of the new institutionalism, scholars observe that courts
often function much like executive agencies within a political regime in that they both “are
and thoughtful controversy about a matter. In the case of the prayer decisions, the intellectual preparation had not
been done, and more work was still required to make that a question worth bringing to the Court.” Caplan 101-102.
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staffed by politically appointed office holders who have policy-making responsibilities over
issues that are of interest to party leaders and their constituents.”43 Scholarship generated in this
vein (1) explains why courts are “active” on issues such as economic regulation in the Lochner
era44 and civil rights during the New Deal/Great Society;45 (2) how parties empower courts as a
means of entrenching ideological commitments;46 (3) how courts serve as cover for elected
officials unwilling or unable to render policy in a highly controversial area;47 (4) how courts can
announce elite consensus on constitutionalized issues.48
This brief study invites another category. Courts are invited and encouraged (enticed?) to
play a role in realizing a priority of the dominant national regime—one that also enjoys
significant popular support—but refuses to do so. The Court’s school prayer jurisprudence is
consistent with a split in elite opinion and it is possible that the divide on the high court is simply
further evidence of this elite cleavage but such a conclusion tells us nothing about how
institutional rules and norms can motivate and frustrate policy chance and political development.
Nor would such a conclusion provide insight into constitutional lawmaking.
An acute focus on entrepreneurial activity designed to bring about changes to
constitutional policy can bring into focus limitations on the capacity of political regimes to
realize their first-order preferences. Moreover, scrutinizing the relationship between political
entrepreneurs and the American legal system identifies exogenous and endogenous forces for
change (e.g. institutional changes to aid in altering school prayer jurisprudence and judicial
personnel sympathetic to change) and exogenous and endogenous sources of resistance to that
change (e.g. rule of law concerns in the SG’s office and justices concerned with upholding
precedent). In so doing, we move beyond institutionally thin accounts of the courts in regime
politics and toward an understanding of the boundaries and limitations of courts within the
dominant national coalition.
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